Empirical literature on the analysis of the efficiency of measures for reducing persistent government deficits has mainly focused on the direct explanation of deficit. By contrast, this paper aims at modeling government revenue and expenditure within a simultaneous framework and deriving the fiscal balance (surplus or deficit) equation as the difference between the two variables. This setting enables one to not only judge how relevant the explanatory variables are in explaining the fiscal balance but also understand their impact on revenue and/ or expenditure. Our empirical results, obtained by using a panel data set on Swiss Cantons for the period 1980-2002, confirm the relevance of the approach followed here, by providing unambiguous evidence of a simultaneous relationship between revenue and expenditure. They also reveal strong dynamic components in revenue, expenditure, and fiscal balance. Among the significant determinants of public fiscal balance we not only find the usual business cycle elements, but also and more importantly institutional factors such as the number of administrative units, and the ease with which people can resort to political (direct democracy) instruments, such as public initiatives and referendum.
INTRODUCTION
Persistent budget deficits became an issue of growing concern to governments during the 1990s. Various measures were taken to balance the budget, such as linear and/or targeted reduction in spending, increase in revenue, and fiscal regulations like budget constraints.
This concern for debt sustainability and the consequent diversity of government responses triggered a large amount of theoretical and empirical research. Theoretical contributions focused on explaining recurring deficits by processes ranging from the expression of public choices to the provision of public services. Empirical investigations focused on testing the theoretical assumptions and identifying the measures that are most successful in limiting the deficits and could, hence, be recommended to policy makers.
Empirical approach has mostly been concerned with direct modeling of fiscal balance (deficit or surplus) making it the dependent variable in a regression equation (see the literature review in the next section). However, we propose a different approach in this paper by simultaneously modeling revenue and expenditure, and then deriving the net impact of the explanatory variables on fiscal balance. Joint modeling is more appropriate for two reasons. First, it allows one to take into consideration structural restrictions based on theory as well as the interdependence between revenue and expenditure. Further, it enables us to understand the effect of different explanatory variables on revenue and/or expenditure separately. Thus it provides a deeper explanation of how deficits are formed and a more substantive empirical basis for concrete policy recommendations for governments.
Our empirical context relating to the 26 Swiss Cantons offers a quasi-experimental design to test our simultaneous modeling strategy because there are considerable economic, demographic, institutional, and budgetary variations among them. These large institutional and fiscal differences are primarily due to a high degree of federalism combined with a direct democracy (initiative and referendum) system whose modus operandi is different from one Canton to another. At the same time these Cantons can be jointly considered for the analysis as the context is identical (homogenous definition and measurement of variables, same currency, and same legal system at the federal level).
Cantons of course differ in size. 1 They have the basic power to tax income and capital. On average, these two resources make up for about 45 percent of the total revenue of the Cantons. However, the tax base and the tax burden vary a great deal from one Canton to another.
2 Some Cantons give voters the possibility to participate in the budgetary process with referendum on the budget draft, the budget deficit, or the tax rate.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the economic literature on deficits. The third section presents the single-equation approach and the simultaneous approach for analyzing the fiscal balance. After giving the definition of the variables and the functional form, the fourth section discusses some special features of our data set. It also examines relevant modeling strategies in presence of panel data and nonstationarity and explains the particular choice made in our application. The fifth 1. According to the Federal Statistical Office, in 2007, the population of the Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden is 15,471 inhabitants compared with 1,397,567 of Zurich.
2. For example, in 2004, the tax burden was about three times higher in the fiscally least attractive canton (Obwalden) compared with the most attractive (Zug), according to the Federal Department of Finance. section discusses our empirical results concerning the impact of various determinants on the Cantons' revenue, expenditure, and balance. We conclude the paper with some policy recommendations based on our findings.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON PUBLIC DEFICIT
Fiscal imbalances and public debt have long been analyzed from a normative perspective in the political economy literature. 3 This approach is grounded on the fiscal position of the median voter, which could often be assimilated to the position of a hypothetical benevolent social planner. 4 The median voter trades off the marginal utility of the publicly provided services against their marginal cost. 5 Subsequently a positive approach emerged in the context of public choice. 6 It is now generally agreed that particular political agents with specific interests distort choices that would otherwise be made by the benevolent social planner. Hence, one needs to combine economic theory with the analysis of collective choice under the influence of groups with diverging interests in order to fully understand budget deficits and public debts. 7 There are several theoretical models of budget deficits that incorporate these components. Alesina and Perotti 8 and Pinho 9 group these models into seven broad categories.
Models based on the theory of political business cycle and naı¨ve voters with fiscal illusion, which predict higher deficits before elections than in postelectoral periods. Models based on the partisan cycles theory predicting that deficits are higher when left-wing party is in office and lower when right-wing party is in power.
11
Models of debt as a strategic variable used by incumbent policy makers if they expect to be defeated in the next election to affect the fiscal condition that the future government would have to compromise with (tax revenues committed to debt service 12 ). Models of redistribution conflicts: a conflict may arise because a current selfish generation can vote for policies that shift the burden of taxation to future generations; other possible conflicts may also occur between better-off and worse-off individuals within the same generation; between employed and unemployed individuals, between regions, between labor and capital, between organized and unorganized groups. Models of conflicts among political parties predicting that the deeper the conflict the greater the difficulties to limit the deficits.
13
Models of geographically dispersed interests explaining aggregate deficit through geographic distribution of costs, benefits, and decision power.
14 Political representatives of regional constituencies may overestimate the benefits of public expenditure in their region relating to cost if the financing costs are borne by all the taxpayers and not only those living in the region. Models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions in fiscal outcome. Budget institutions include all the laws, rules, and regulations according to which budget is drafted and implemented. 15 There is a fairly large body of literature devoted to testing the empirical validity of the above theoretical models. Many studies do it on the basis of an estimated relationship between public debt (dependent variable) and relevant explanatory factors, for instance, business cycle indicators. Barro's 16 analysis suggests that countercyclical government spending accounts for a large portion of the size of the public debt, whereas Lowery 17 found that deficits are strongly related to unemployment levels but not inflation. However, these variables did not adequately explain the financial position of OECD countries, especially the 36 Thus, even though we are not the first ones to consider bidirectional causality between revenue and expenditure, our study provides a complete implementation of this idea using an appropriate structural econometric model for analyzing deficit.
MODELING FISCAL BALANCE
Fiscal balance (surplus S or deficit D) is defined as the difference between revenue R and expenditure E (S 5 R À E, D 5 E À R). In our model, we adopt the convention of modeling S with the understanding that when S is negative we are in fact talking of a deficit. All factors that influence revenue and/or expenditure determine its sign and size. One can thus distinguish three groups among the explanatory variables of fiscal balance: first, variables that influence revenue but not expenditure (XR); second, variables that influence expenditure but not revenue (XE); third, variables that influence both revenue and expenditure (XRE):
where S t denotes the surplus for period t and XR 
where g R 6 ¼0 and g E 6 ¼0. However, the model may also feature two independent equations (g R 5 0 and g E 5 0) or be a triangular system (g R 5 0 or g E 5 0). Among the exogenous variables, one may find variables only influencing revenue (XR) or expenditure (XE); variables jointly influencing revenue and expenditure, but with a noncompensating strength so as to have a nonzero impact on fiscal balance in the end (XRE1) and eventually, variables jointly influencing revenue and expenditure but compensating each other out so that they end up having no impact on the fiscal balances (XRE0). e Rt and e Et are random disturbance terms such that E[e Rt e Et ]6 ¼0. The reduced form of the simultaneous equation model explains revenue and expenditure only in terms of exogenous variables. Because revenue and expenditure are endogenous in the model, they will be (except in special cases) linked to all the exogenous variables in the reduced form because of the mutual influence via g R and g E .
where
Thus, the relationships between the structural and reduced form coefficients may lead to additional constraints among the parameters. These constraints have to be taken into account while estimating the model. Subtracting expenditure from revenue results in the surplus model derived from the simultaneous equation system:
where f S ¼ f1 R À f1 E , etc.
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From this derivation, one can see why joint modeling of revenue and expenditure is more insightful than directly modeling surplus or deficit. First, this approach not only makes it possible to obtain the impact of an explanatory variable on the deficit, but also enables to identify its impact on the two major components of deficit, namely revenue and expenditure. Secondly, it allows to test the existence of the simultaneous relationship between the above two components of deficit. Thirdly, it produces more accurate results by taking into account the constraints on the parameters of the deficit equation resulting from the underlying structural model.
SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL

Endogenous Variables
Various models rooted in the median voter theory predict that revenue and expenditure are interdependent by nature. 39 Governments tailor the provision of public services to meet the citizens' demand. Citizens trade off the marginal benefit of each service with its marginal cost when they express their demand. This echoes the common sense according to which people make decisions regarding revenue under the constraint of the expenditure to be financed (what must we pay for?), whereas decisions regarding expenditure are made under the constraint of revenue (what can we afford?).
From a purely practical point of view, other reasons explain why it is necessary to introduce the level of revenue as an explanatory variable for expenditure and the level of expenditure as an explanatory variable for revenue. For instance, the public's concern about deficits and debt forces governments to secure the right balance between revenue and expenditure to avoid snowballing of debt and interest payments eating up revenue. Furthermore, any surplus is likely to be targeted by various interest groups. Should revenue be higher than what is expected in a fiscal year, the leeway increases together with the possibility of financing additional spending or tax cuts. In contrast, when revenue tends to be lower than what is forecasted, governments introduce, sometimes almost immediately, mitigating measures to avoid worsening of the deficit. Besides these discretionary measures, governments earmark the revenue and the expenditure they pay for, increasing the dependency between both sides of the budget. Indeed, earmarking is a common practice to increase the acceptance of new taxes. Further, earmarking arises when the provision of various public services is directly paid for using levies that are in turn calculated to cover the cost of provision.
Concretely speaking, our simultaneous equations system explains the per capita revenue and expenditure (denoted as REVENUE and EXPENDITURE 40 ) of the 26 Swiss Cantons. This model is used to derive the equation for the fiscal balance, which is also the per capita borrowing requirement in the case of deficit or the amount of debt the Canton is able to pay back in the case of surplus. REVENUE and EXPENDITURE are expressed in per capita terms because there is a large variation in the population size of Cantons: ZurichFthe biggest CantonFhas 135 times more inhabitants than the smallest Canton, Appenzell Innerrhoden. The values are also in real terms because we use annual observations over the period . 41 Heteroskedasticity of errors is thus largely attenuated as compared with using nominal figures.
Explanatory Variables
Drawing from the previous literature on public deficit and based on the typology provided by Garand and Kapeluck, 42 our explanatory variables belong to different categories: institutional, political, economic, and structural. 43 Lagged endogenous variables, that is REVENUE( À 1) and EXPENDITURE( À 1), are used to take into account the inertia of revenue and expenditure. Incremental budgeting (according to which previous budget components are increased or decreased by small increments in the current year's budget 44 ) may also explain the frequently observed inertia of revenue and expenditure. These variables therefore reflect the institutional framework within which the budgetary process takes place. Existing constitutional and legal commitments also prevent revenue and expenditure from being annually re-examined. Higg's 45 contention that expenditure or revenue does not return to its previous level after a significant increase due to an exceptional event must also be considered. There are several arguments that favor this contention: (a) bureaucrats resist downsizing of the State, (b) during crisis periods, expertise of civil servants and politicians increases leading to enhanced productivity and rise in marginal benefit associated with public services, and (c) during crisis, citizens' perception of the utility of the State changes; they show preference toward public services. 40 . We write the names of variables in small capital letters so that they can be spotted easily in the text. 41. The implicit deflator of GDP is used to deflate all the variables expressed in monetary terms, including revenue, expenditure, and fiscal balance. Appendix A provides some descriptive statistics.
42 As for additional institutional determinants, the possible right of citizens to initiate a change in the legislation or oppose a spending proposal through a fiscal referendum may also have an impact on the government's fiscal position. In other words, financial REFERENDUMs give citizens a veto right on spending proposals that exceed a given amount. 46 Their influence can be direct, because voters may refuse the expenditure that is put to the ballot. It can also be indirect in that it moderates the scope of the proposed projects, because the promoters wish to avoid the project going up for vote or, if put to vote, have it rejected by the voters. Each Swiss Canton is free to introduce the option for referendum on expenditure issues in its legislation and to design it (e.g., the minimum amount to trigger a referendum) in its own way. As a result, the degree of pressure on expenditure varies among the Cantons. Here, we use the index developed by Frey and Stutzer 47 to measure the stringency of REFERENDUM. 48 Another index devised by these authors has also been used to evaluate how easy it is for citizens to put forward INITIATIVES for new laws or change existing laws. 49 The easier it is (for instance, lower number of peopleFi.e., signaturesFrequired in support of the proposal, longer time span to collect signatures), the more difficult it becomes for the lobbies to manipulate the political decision process to suit their interests. 50 If, as generally assumed, citizens favor solutions that are cheaper than those proposed by the government, easier ways of introducing an initiative must negatively influence expenditure. However, Matsusaka 51 does not exclude the possibility that citizens' proposals can trigger higher expenditures than what would otherwise have been spent. Hence, INITIATIVES may also positively influence expenditure. As initiatives also deal with Cantonal tax laws, revenue may be positively or negatively affected. Therefore, the expected impact of the variable INITIATIVES on fiscal balance remains undecided. 48. The legal prescriptions regarding referendums to prevent new State expenditure differ from Canton to Canton. The referendum can be either mandatory or optional. A mandatory referendum is automatically organized when a new spending proposal exceeds a fixed limit. An optional referendum takes place only if a citizen or a group of citizens collects a required number of signatures within a given time span. The financial limit, the required number of signatures, and the time span are Canton specific. The variable REFERENDUM was constructed following Frey and Stutzer (2005) . The stringency of the mandatory referendum depends only on the financial limit (per capita) and is evaluated on a 6-point scale (1 is a high barrier, 6 is a low one). The stringency of the optional referendum is evaluated on the same scale for each dimension (financial limit, signature, and time span). The three resulting indices are aggregated using a simple average. Then the variable REFERENDUM is the maximum of the index for the mandatory referendum and the composite index for the optional referendum.
49. The number of signatures required to launch an initiative and the time span within which the signatures have to be collected vary from Canton to Canton. The variable INITIATIVE is constructed in the same way as optional referendums.
50. Mutsusaka (1995). 51. Ibid.
The size of the administration, particularly the number of DEPARTMENTS, is a variable whose influence has not been tested so far. However, its possible impact is grounded either on the spendthrift behavior that Niskanen 52 credits government with or on Velasco's 53 idea that the government's budget can be considered as a common good pulled by various interest groups. Therefore, the larger the number of departments, the higher would be the expenditure and hence the worse the budget balance.
As for economic factors, GROWTH rate is expected to affect the budget balance through the automatic stabilizers and discretionary countercyclical decisions that should increase spending/reduce revenue during recession and improve the balance with lower spending/ higher revenue during economic expansion. The percentage change in GDP is commonly used as a measure of business cycle activity. However, as there is no official data available on Cantonal GDP, growth rates in Cantonal income have been used here. The UNEMPLOYMENT rate is also often used to reflect the economic situation. Over the time period of our study , it can, however, only be used in addition to GROWTH, firstly because joblessness only appeared in Switzerland since the early 1990s (before that, job losses were compensated by the departure of new immigrant workers) and secondly because unemployment benefits, being taxable, prevent the shrinkage of the tax base. So UNEMPLOYMENT has no impact on revenue and is expected to influence expenditure negatively, thus deteriorating the deficit.
We consider many political variables to test if preferences regarding the role of the State actually make a difference. Several variables can be and have been used in this regard. The Cabinet's political leaning supposedly reflects individuals' preferences when members are democratically elected. Following Hibbs, 54 right-wing elected officials demonstrate more fiscal conservatism than their left-wing counterparts. Consequently, the more the number of right-wing officials in the Cabinet, the lesser the deficit or the more the surplus should be. This assumption is, however, subject to discussion. In fact, although the left-wing officials are reputed to favor expenditure, they also favor taxes and thus revenue. 55 Consequently, a Cabinet dominated by right-wing officials may eventually have a negative influence on revenue and expenditure, while the influence on surplus is uncertain. The political leaning is defined by the number of right-wing members in Cantonal Cabinets (RIGHT-WING).
The size of the COALITION, measured by the number of parties represented in the Cabinet, is a frequent variable in empirical models (though not in models estimated using Swiss data). The higher the number of parties, the lesser the chances of government's actions being concerted and concentrated. This would reduce the Cabinet's ability to trade off between various spending requirements 56 and increase its ability to agree on a tax pressure. Therefore, a larger coalition should theoretically lower the revenue, but increase the expenditure, and thus worsen the fiscal balance (lower surplus or higher deficit).
By the same reasoning, if the Cabinet's composition differs from that of the parliament, it reduces the Cabinet's ability to deal with the parliament in trading off between various expenditures and getting support for a revenue increase. Therefore, lack of CONCORDANCE should also increase expenditure and lower revenue.
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According to Nordhaus's 58 theory of electoral cycles, politicians will seek election or re-election by cosseting their clientele via public budgets. Hence, during the election year, the revenue would be lower and expenditure higher, thus deteriorating the fiscal balance. The dummy variable ELECTION-YEAR, which takes the value 1 during general election years and 0 at other times, is used to test this phenomenon.
Finally, structural characteristics, reflecting differences in preference between groups of population, often constitute important elements to be modeled in structural equations. For instance, one usually considers that expenditure for ELDERLY people is greater than that for other categories of population, whereas this group adds relatively less to the tax base. Therefore, the share of ELDERLY in the population should increase expenditure and negatively influence revenue and budget balance. On the contrary, one may advocate that the elderly are more conservative than others and thus more likely to favor a rigorous fiscal policy. 59 In Switzerland, the attitude regarding the role of the State clearly differs between the linguistic regions. Inhabitants of the German-speaking Cantons are assumed to be more distrustful of State intervention than their French-and Italian-speaking counterparts (especially the Canton of Geneva, e.g.). The latter categories are said to hold the doctrine of balanced budget in lesser esteem. 60 A dummy variable (LANGUAGE) taking the value of 1 for French-or Italian-speaking Cantons, and 0 for others is used to test this assumption, together with a dummy for GENEVA the most ''spendthrift'' of all Cantons. LANGUAGE and GENEVA are expected to increase revenue, expenditure, and deficits. 
Choice of the Model
While working with time series, one should first investigate the nature of the processes (in terms of stationarity) before deciding on the appropriate specification of the model. According to Hsiao, 61 it is possible to formulate a simultaneous equation model with the variables in levels if the variables of each equation are either stationary or cointegrated (and if any variable that is present in the equation but does not enter the cointegrating relation is also stationary). Appendix C reports the results of Maddala and Wu's 62 unit root tests and Appendix D the results of Pedroni's 63 cointegration tests. The relatively few observations per Canton motivate the use of such panel unit root and cointegration tests instead of testing each Canton separately. Further, the small size of our sample also leads us to assume identical coefficients for all Cantons. In line with the existing literature, the unit root tests show that revenue and expenditure are I(1) and that all the other variables (including the balances) are I(0). According to Engle and Granger, 64 if a linear combination of I(1) variables is stationary, then they are said to be cointegrated. Pedroni's 65 test confirms cointegration between revenue and expenditure. Thus we can keep them in levels in our equations.
Stochastic Assumptions
Three statistical methods can possibly be used to address the issue of Cantonal heterogeneity: (a) the White correction for heteroskedasticity, (b) the estimation of different error variances for different Cantons, and (c) the inclusion of Canton-specific fixed effects. 66 Although Wald test results indicate that models with fixed effects must be preferred to those without, we could not include them in our model as our equations contain explanatory variables that do not vary (or vary little) over the considered time 61 span and hence their coefficients will not be estimated in a fixed effect estimation procedure. For instance, LANGUAGE does not vary over time and thus cannot be added along with fixed effects and DEPARTMENTS is also almost collinear with the Cantonal fixed effects and produces unstable coefficient estimates. 67 Finally, the relatively small number of observations available compared with the number of parameters to be estimated can only give rise to models with a limited number of statistically significant variables. All these considerations made us go for the White correction procedure rather than adding more parameters characterizing heteroskedasticity.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our sample is a balanced panel data set and contains annual observations relating to all the 26 Swiss Cantons over the period , that is, 624(26 Â 24) observations per variable. Their summary statistics are given in Appendix A, while Appendix B provides information on how inconsistencies or particularities that perturb the considered longrun relation were rectified in revenue and expenditure data. Table 1 presents the results of 3SLS estimation of our model. The derived surplus equation is based on the difference between the reduced form equations for expenditure and revenue as explained in the third section. For the sake of comparison, we also present, in the last column, the results obtained by directly estimating a single-equation model that explains the surplus as a function of the same explanatory variables. 69 The models in Table 1 include most of the considered explanatory variables. However, some variables are dropped, essentially from the revenue equation, either because they should not have any influence according to theory or they did not turn out be significant. Appendix E shows the results for a model incorporating the full set of explanatory variables. While the t-tests show that some coefficients are not individually significant, the F-ratios indicate that they are jointly significant. This is probably due to the relatively high number of the coefficients to be estimated compared with the number of available 67 . The values, based on the criterion of David A. Belsley, Edwin W. Kuh, and Roy E. Welsch, Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1980), range from 20 to over 80 for the majority of the matrices composed solely of the fixed effects and of one of the proposed variables. Now, Belsley and colleagues consider that problems of high multicollinearity are likely to start from the value of 20 for the matrices comprising all the explanatory variables introduced in a model. Therefore, it is not surprising that the values of coefficient estimates changed significantly depending on the variables included in the individual fixed effect models.
68. Our results showed that the coefficients obtained with alternative techniques are quantitatively and qualitatively close to those presented.
69. REFERENDUM could potentially be endogenous like other variables that Cantons may influence (INITIATIVE and DEPARTMENTS). Hence, we use the lagged value as an instrument for REFERENDUM, as done by Feld and Matsusaka (2003) . The same procedure is adopted for INITIATIVE but not for DEPARTMENTS, because this variable is almost invariant over the considered period and thus is independent with regard to endogenous variables. observations. At the same time, using the explained lagged variable as an explanatory variable reduces or even masks the significance of other explanatory variables.
The results obtained confirm the existence of a simultaneous relation between revenue and expenditure. However, the relation is stronger in the direction of revenue to expenditure, with greater flexibility of expenditure as compared with revenue (0.306 against 0.121). This greater flexibility may also explain why revenue displays greater inertia than expenditure as can be seen from the lagged variables' coefficients (0.882 against 0.695).
Recognizing the strong correlation between explained variables and their lagged variables (more than 0.98), one may wonder if the whole influence can be attributed to lagged variables excluding any simultaneous relationship between revenue and expenditure. The simultaneous relationship cannot be refuted at a conceptual level as for instance some laws explicitly require or justify matching revenues (or expenditures) for providing specific public services (or collecting specific revenues). Further, the fact that a net inertia appears both in the derived model and in the comparison model (with the budget balance as unique explained variable) is ample evidence that both an autoregressive and a simultaneous relationship exist between revenue and expenditure. Indeed, the coefficients of the lagged variables REVENUE( À 1) and EXPENDITURE( À 1) are 0.636 and À 0.625 in the derived model and the coefficient of SURPLUS( À 1) is 0.660 in the comparison (direct) model. Note that this value is in line with the findings of Dafflon and Pujol 70 who are the only ones so far to use this lagged variable as an explanatory factor of Cantonal balances.
Other variables have a more limited explanatory power on revenue, expenditure, or balance. Appendix F emphasizes this phenomenon by presenting estimated coefficients in terms of standard deviations of explanatory and explained variables. Note that they influence the fiscal balance more than both revenue and expenditure. For instance, even though GROWTH has an almost equal impact on REVENUE and BALANCE in absolute terms, it is not the case in relative terms: an increase of one percentage point of GROWTH implies an increase of CHF 23.5 per person (0.014 standard deviation) over the period, but an improvement of CHF 26.8 per inhabitant (0.102 standard deviation) in the surplus (surplus increase or deficit reduction). Besides, the influence of specific explanatory variables on fiscal balance does not qualitatively differ between the simultaneous and the comparison (direct) models. In spite of this, large quantitative differences often arise, mainly because weakly significant explanatory variables are removed from the revenue equation. On the other hand, the coefficients of the ''common'' variables (common to both revenue and expenditure equations) are not very different from those of the direct model.
More fundamentally, the variables benefit from higher levels of significance in the simultaneous model than in the direct model. In fact, the levels of significance are so low in the direct model that they would not have been retained if not for comparison purposes.
The finding that revenue is more sensitive to GROWTH than expenditure is entirely plausible; a large share of revenue is represented by taxes levied on individuals' income and firms' profit, which are quite sensitive to economic situation, whereas expenditure, which is mainly on education, social security, and health care, is more sensitive to demographic and political considerations.
As expected, UNEMPLOYMENT increases expenditure due to rising social security spending during downturns and deteriorates the balance according to the simultaneous model. It must be pointed out that the variable is insignificant in the direct model. Moreover, its influence is also weaker than in the derived one ( À 7.6 instead of À 22.3). Thus, one can perceive the benefit of simultaneous modeling over direct modeling. Indeed, the estimates provided by the direct model are based on the implicit assumption that UNEMPLOYMENT impacts revenue positively. Introducing the variable in the revenue equation of the simultaneous model allows us to show it. The UNEMPLOYMENT's coefficient would amount to 18.8 in the revenue equation and to 26.4 in the expenditure equation. So the net impact ( À 11.8) would be fairly close to the one given by the direct model ( À 7.6). However, the positive influence of unemployment on revenue cannot be justified because unemployment benefits cannot exceed the wages of laid-off persons.
REFERENDUM has a negative influence on public spending, which is almost fully carried over to fiscal balances. As it correlates quite strongly with LANGUAGE ( À 0.75), part of its effect may well reflect the difference in preferences between German-speaking Cantons on the one hand and French-and Italian-speaking Cantons on the other. This explanation seems realistic because LANGUAGE is often positively and significantly correlated with revenue and expenditure in the earlier studies of the Swiss Cantons. However, the sign of LANGUAGE was found to be so unstable in many of the models that we tested and its level of significance was so low that it was eventually removed from the model shown in Table 1 . 71 For the same reasons, INITIATIVE was also removed from the revenue equation. Nonetheless, it positively influences public spending and shows that successful initiatives can help in triggering additional public services rather than eliminating the existing ones or changing the tax burden.
As theory predicts, the number of DEPARTMENTS increases expenditure and worsens fiscal balance. Thus, the restructuring efforts taken over the period delivered the expected results (214 departments in the 26 Cantons in 1980 and 168 in 2002).
The so-called culture of consensus in Switzerland probably explains why COALITION happens to be systematically insignificant in all the models we tested. This result corroborates the findings of previous studies for Switzerland.
The RIGHT-WING leaning of the Cabinet negatively impacts both revenue and expenditure. Therefore, its effect on fiscal balance depends on the respective magnitudes of its influence on the two variables. But it also depends on the influence of revenue on 71. When included, LANGUAGE is always insignificant whatever be the model (see Appendix F). expenditure and that of expenditure on revenue. Our empirical estimations show that fiscal balance deteriorates when the Cabinet shifts to the right. 72 However, the confidence interval of the variable includes zero ( À 1.17 to 2.42). Therefore, it is statistically impossible to exclude zero or even positive impact. Just like the findings regarding COALI-TION, this result comes as a surprise in comparison to the results obtained from other countries. 73 However, previous studies for Switzerland also report a dampening influence on expenditure and revenue and no significant influence on the balance.
As expected, a higher degree of CONCORDANCE between the Cabinet and the parliament lessens public spending and thus improves fiscal balance. Only Vatter and Freitag 74 tested this variable so far; however, they report it as insignificant.
We find that the coefficients for ELECTION-YEAR are sufficiently stable in all the variants explored to keep this variable in the expenditure equation. On the contrary, these coefficients are not stable enough in the revenue equation. The reason for this could be that one can more easily manipulate the level of spending than that of revenue. Additionally, an improvement in public services may produce an electoral benefit for elected officials or parties in power. This result confirms that the Swiss political system, despite its characteristics of concordance and consensus, is open to vote-catching behavior. However, such behavior hardly explains the size of the fiscal balance, as shown by the standardized coefficient.
The influence of the share of ELDERLY people in the population is in line with theoretical expectations: negative on expenditure and positive on fiscal balance. However, just as UNEMPLOYEMENT, it sometimes has a positive influence in the revenue equation. Such unlikely impacts lead us to remove it in this particular equation.
The dummy variable representing GENEVA turns out to be constantly significant with a positive influence on expenditure and a negative one on balance. This demonstrates that other explanatory variables in the models cannot adequately explain the big and repeated fiscal imbalances suffered by the Canton over the period. The variable does not show such stability and significance in the revenue equation.
CONCLUSIONS
The main aim of this study has been to highlight the simultaneous relationship between government revenue and expenditure and the need to model them jointly for a proper 72. Switzerland is a country of coalition and consensus in which, unlike other countries, there is no marked changeover of political power between parties. Thus, the variable RIGHT-WING quantifies more the effect of a greater or lesser shift to the right or to the left than the effect of right-wing as opposed to leftwing government. For all the Cantons and for the entire period, the average value for this variable is 78 percent and the value for the few governments with a left majority does not exceed 40 percent. identification of the determinants of public deficits. Direct modeling of surplus/deficit completely ignores any potential endogeneity of revenue and expenditure. Nor does it enable a finer analysis of the underlying mechanism through which an explanatory variable influences surplus/deficit, for instance, it does not allow for the possibility that an explanatory variable only affects revenue without affecting expenditure or vice versa.
Our empirical results confirm the relevance of the simultaneous approach. It is first verified by the existence of a cointegrating relation between the two variables and their lags. Secondly, the fact that some of the other explanatory variables of both revenue and expenditure are highly significant unambiguously demonstrates that we are not in presence of a tautological relationship that would have meant a coefficient of 1 for revenue in the expenditure equation (and vice versa) and 0 for the other variables.
A good example of the benefit resulting from being able to take into account the restriction of a structural model is the derived impact of UNEMPLOYMENT on fiscal balance. Should one refer to a direct model of its influence on balance, then one would implicitly accept that this net impact is a consequence of a hypothetical and unlikely positive influence of revenue. The simultaneous framework allows us to model its influence only on expenditure because no influence is theoretically expected on revenue due to unemployment benefits.
The low level of significance of some variables in the (direct) balance equation would imply that we would have retained a different set of variables if the selection of variables were driven by the results of direct models of fiscal balances. This would also have led to different recommendations for policy makers compared with those based on our simultaneous model of expenditure and revenue. This leads us to conclude that the simultaneous approach should be systematically adopted in future works devoted to public deficit/surplus analysis for all countries. In light of our results, this statement is even more relevant when it comes to examining the influence of variables that only affect either expenditure or revenue. It is indeed for these variables that we see an important difference between the direct estimation of the deficit equation and the indirect derivation of the same from the structural model. Our joint approach enables us to arrive at conclusions based on proper inference using a more appropriate representation of reality.
The explanatory power of the inertia of revenue and expenditure indicates a strong dynamic component in the levels (and probably in the components) of revenue and expenditure. The strength of this dynamic component shows how difficult it is, at least in the short run, to counteract public deficits and advocates for a conservative fiscal policy which aims to avoid deficits rather than first letting them accumulate and then trying to reduce their size. This type of policy implies planning ahead for funding future expenditures in addition to keeping the surplus made in the economic growth period for compensating for the deficit in a recession.
The results on growth rates and unemployment rates show that business cycle contributes significantly to the fiscal position of the Swiss Cantons. These variables can hardly be influenced to balance the budget and particularly so in our empirical context as the Swiss Cantons work like small open economies.
Fortunately, there are some variables that the Cantons do have control on. For instance, our results show that the Cantons can improve their fiscal position (i.e., increase the surplus or lower the deficit) by cutting down the number of departments in their administration. However, this solution is now almost exhausted because the number of remaining departments is already quite small (seven or even five).
Regarding the effect of direct democracy instruments, the present findings show that when fiscal referendum is more easily triggered (with lower thresholds of financial amount and number of signatures, and a greater time span), it reduces expenditure and deficits. Hence, it can be recommended that Cantons should strengthen their referendum possibilities to benefit in terms of deficit reduction. As for the right to put forward initiatives for new laws, the present results point in the opposite direction: the easier it is to use this right, the higher would be the expenditure and thus the deficit.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B: ADJUSTMENTS ON REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE DATA
In this appendix, we explain how certain adjustments had to be made to the revenue and expenditure data to remove their variation due to ''exceptional'' eventsFpolitical decisions that induced a major change in their value in a particular year. However, we have only taken off the direct impact and not tried to simulate how the Cantons would have behaved (before, during, and after) if these events had not taken place. Moreover, it is also very difficult to simulate the financial influences of these adjustments on other variables. Thus, revenues were adjusted to eliminate the direct influence of the privatization of the Cantonal bank of Appenzell Ausserrhoden in 1996 (CHF 180 million, which represents over 57 percent of the Canton's revenue; percentages are expressed as a function of the adjusted levels), the conversion of the Cantonal bank of St. Gallen into a public limited company in 2000 (CHF 500 million, 16 percent) and privatization of the same bank in 2001 (CHF 160 million, 5 percent) and two exceptional bequests in Tessin in 1988 (6 percent) and in 1994 (almost 5 percent). The revenue was also adjusted to take into account the collection of extraordinary revenue by Glarus in 2000 in relation to the tax on the profit of legal entities (CHF 35 million; 10.5 percent) 75 and the decline observed for Zug in 1999. 76 Similarly, expenditure was adjusted to neutralize the direct effects of the capitalization of the Cantonal Bank of Geneva in 1993 (CHF 147 million, over 2.5 percent) and the stabilization efforts by the same bank through the Revaluation Foundation in 2000 75. While the profit of legal entities generally fluctuates between 20 and 30 million, this revenue had risen to 60 million for that year. Thus, it may be estimated that the revenue surplus is between 30 and 40.
76. This decline is due to the significant fall in the contributions recorded in 1999. It would appear that this decline is not real but can be explained by posterior accounting during the closing of accounts. Thus, the sum of 47 million (6.7 percent) was added to the revenue, calculated through the linear interpolation between the contributions for 1998 and 2000.
(CHF 19 million, 0.3 percent), 2001 (CHF 194 million, 2.5 percent), and 2002 (294 million, 3.7 percent), the transformation of the Cantonal bank of St. Gallen into a public limited company in 2000 (CHF 255 million expenditure, over 8.5 percent), the bankruptcy of the Cantonal bank of Solothurn in 1996 (CHF 34 million, 2.7 percent), in 1997 (CHF 34 million, over 2.5 percent), and in 1998 (CHF 125 million, 9 percent), the recapitalization of the Cantonal bank of Jura in 1997 (CHF 42 million, 7.5 percent) and the termination in 1994 of the special construction program in the Canton of Jura dating from 1985 whose smoothing was planned over 25 years (CHF 41 million, almost 9 percent). Further, the expenditure series was adjusted on the basis of complementary services provided to the pensions and invalidity insurance schemes by Berne in 1986 (CHF 242 million, over 6 percent), the unexplained CHF 36 million break (6 percent; deviation from the linear interpolation between 1984 and 1986) in the series for Uri's expenditure clearly evident in 1985 following the subtraction of transfers relating to the national roads, the expenditure arising from storms in Obwalden in 2000 (over CHF 16 million, or 7.7 percent), the costs that arose in Valais due to the 2001 storms (over CHF 175 million, or almost 8.5 percent) as well as the re-establishment of hydroelectric power stations at a cost of CHF 100 million (almost 5 percent).
Finally, it seemed appropriate to rectify two more details in the posting of operations concerning unemployment insurance. The first one involves the failure to post a loan of around CHF 104 million granted by Aargau to its unemployment insurance fund in 1993 (i.e., almost 4 percent of the Canton's expenditure). The second relates to the posting of two reimbursements in 1994 that were not actually made by Solothurn. The first point amounts to approximately CHF 63 million and the second approximately 32.5 million. No simulation study exists that would indicate a preference for one statistics out of the seven computed. Therefore, cointegration is either accepted or rejected when a majority of the computed tests point toward the former or the latter hypothesis. 
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